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Abstract. Despite the fact that the empirical data indicate the
presence of non-stationarity in wage oﬀer distributions, the ma-
jority of job-search models are stationary. We model logs of wage
oﬀers as a Markov process with i.i.d. increments and solve two typ-
ical job-search models for reservation wages, value functions and
expected individual duration of unemployment. All solutions are
in the closed form and admit interpretation in terms of expected
present values of certain streams of payoﬀs.
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, many studies in labor economics have
attempted to analyze empirically the determinants of individual em-
ployment spell duration of workers looking for a job (see, for example,
Van den Berg (1999) and the bibliography therein). Many of these
studies have used the job search model as a workhorse: for surveys,
see, for example, Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Wolpin (1995). Indeed,
the former review of the empirical literature cites over 500 studies.
The basic job-search model contains three exogenous variables: the
Poisson rate of arrival of job oﬀers, the wage distribution and the un-
employment compensation. If none of these variables change over time
and the time horizon is inﬁnite, then the model is stationary. The
majority of existing job search models are stationary. At the same
time, various empirical studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant duration dependence of
I am thankful to D. Corbae, S. Freeman, B. Smith, and other participants of a
seminar at UT Austin for discussion and comments.
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the probability of being (re)-employed. This dependence indicates the
presence of non-stationarity (see, e.g., Van den Berg (1990) and the
bibliography therein). Moreover, stationary wage distribution is in-
consistent with the productivity shocks modeled as a process in the
neoclassical growth model.
We construct the ﬁrst job-search model where wage oﬀers follow a
stochastic Markov process. To be more speciﬁc, we assume that log-
wages follow a random walk, that is a process with independently and
identically distributed increments. The characteristics of the random
walk are fairly general. Two job-search models are considered in the
paper: the benchmark model, where a worker remains employed forever
if she accepts an oﬀer at some point in time; and the model where the
worker faces a positive probability of being laid oﬀ every period after
the ﬁrst period on the job. Both models are solved for the reservation
wages, value functions, and expected duration of unemployment.
The method of the paper is straightforward and can be summarized
as follows: we assume that an unemployed worker accepts a wage oﬀer
if and only if the wage is not less than a certain barrier called the reser-
vation wage. We ﬁx an arbitrary candidate for the reservation wage
and write the corresponding dynamic programming problem. It turns
out to be the case that the Bellman equation is an integral equation
known as the Wiener-Hopf equation. The latter can be solved for the
value function by the Wiener-Hopf factorization method. The central
point of the method in the form suggested in the paper is that prac-
tically every step of the solution of the optimization problem can be
interpreted as the calculation of the expected present value of a certain
stream of payoﬀs. In particular, in the benchmark model, the expec-
tations are taken under assumption that wages follow the supremum
process ¯ wt = max0·t·s ws (here wt is the wage oﬀer at date t). In the
model with layoﬀs, we also use the process for wages oﬀered every other
period and the supremum of this process. The processes with two time
periods as the basic time unit become involved because the worker can
be laid oﬀ and if this happens, she has to wait one period before a new
oﬀer arrives.
After an explicit formula for the value function has been obtained
by the Wiener-Hopf factorization method, we guess the reservation
wage and verify that the latter maximizes the value function. Also,
we prove the uniqueness of the solution. The reservation wages and
value functions in both models admit closed form solutions in terms
of stochastic integrals. Moreover, explicit analytical solutions can be
obtained as well (see Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i (2002)). In the
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expected waiting time before an oﬀer is accepted for a particular case
of the probability distribution function.
So far, only a few papers have been published that allow for non-
stationarity in job-search models (see, for example, Burdett (1979),
Gronau (1971), Heckman and Singer (1982), Lippman and McCall
(1976) and Mortensen (1986)). These papers consider only very speciﬁc
departures from stationarity and they lack a rigorous derivation of the
reservation wage dynamics. Van den Berg (1990) examines the dynam-
ics of an individual’s reservation wage in a more general non-stationary
job-search model. In his model, all exogenous variables may vary over
time in a rather general way. He derives a diﬀerential equation that
describes the evolution of the reservation wage over time. However,
there are some unrealistic assumptions in Van den Berg’s model. First
of all, it is assumed that once a job oﬀer is accepted, it will be held
forever. The only reason the author does not allow workers to quit or
to be laid oﬀ is the intractability of the corresponding model. Second,
and more important, even though Van den Berg allows the wage dis-
tribution to vary over time, the wage which a worker may be oﬀered in
the future is independent of the current state variables in that model.
When wage oﬀers evolve as a stochastic process, the current state af-
fects possible future wages, therefore the way of modeling of the wage
evolution suggested in the paper is much more realistic than traditional
random draws from independent stationary or even non-stationary dis-
tributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the reader
is reminded about the speciﬁcation of the benchmark job-search model,
the process for wages is speciﬁed and main results for the reservation
wage and value function are given. In Section 3, the rigorous derivation
of results for the benchmark model is presented. Section 4 contains the
solution for the model with layoﬀs. In Section 5, we derive explicit
analytical formulas for the reservation wages for the case when the
probability distribution function for increments of log-wages is given as
(or can be approximated by) a simple exponential polynomial. In this
case, the problem reduces to computation of the roots of a quadratic
polynomial. At the same time, the model is rather ﬂexible: it admits
jumps in wages in both directions and the relative sizes of large and
small jumps can be controlled by the parameters of the PDF. The
reservation wage formulas allow one to analyze how the workers respond
to changes in the parameters of the underlying stochastic process. In
Section 6, the formula for the expected waiting time is derived, and for
the case of exponential polynomials, the explicit solution is given. For
the latter case, we also provide the necessary and suﬃcient condition4 S. BOYARCHENKO
(in terms of the parameters of the PDF) of ﬁniteness of the expected
waiting time. The result is particularly simple in the case of continuous
PDF: the expected waiting time is ﬁnite if and only if the drift of the
log-wage is positive, and if it is positive, then the expected waiting time
is inverse proportional to the drift as in the deterministic continuous
time model. Section 7 contains ﬁnal remarks. The most technical issues
are delegated to the Appendix.
2. Benchmark model: main results
2.1. Problem speciﬁcation. Consider a problem of intertemporal
job search. Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite: t = 0;1;:::. An
unemployed worker devises a strategy to maximize the present value






where E is the expectation conditioned on information available at
t = 0, 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, u is the instantaneous utility
function such that u0 > 0 and u00 · 0, and zt is the instantaneous
income. In this paper, we consider the linear utility: u(z) = z. Gen-
eralization to the case of Cobb-Douglas utility is straightforward and
more general utility functions can be considered as well.
If the worker is unemployed at date t, she receives the unemployment
income: zt = b ¸ 0, where b is the unemployment insurance beneﬁt
less of search costs. At the same time, the worker gets a wage oﬀer wt,
one at each date t.1 The worker has an option of rejecting an oﬀer and
waiting until next period for a new wage oﬀer to arrive. Alternatively,
the worker can accept a wage oﬀer w, in which case she will be paid
the wage w every period starting from the date of acceptance.2 Thus
the value function deﬁned by (2.1) is a function of the current wage
oﬀer w, which is the state variable in the model. Notice that the value








1For simplicity, we assume that job oﬀers arrive every period when the worker
is unemployed, otherwise, we could have introduced a probability of random oﬀer
arrivals.
2We disregard layoﬀs, quits and recalls in this model; the model with layoﬀs will
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We assume that wage oﬀers follow a stochastic process; to be more
speciﬁc, we assume that the log-wage Xt = lnwt admits a decompo-
sition Xt = X0 + Y1 + ::: + Yt, where Y1;:::;Yt are independently
and identically distributed random variables on the probability space
Ω (one says that X is a random walk on R). We impose the following
condition on the wage process:
¯E[wt=wt¡1] = ¯E[w1=w0] < 1: (2.2)
Equation (2.2) ensures that the value function (2.1) is ﬁnite, which can
be argued as follows. The value function does not exceed the sum of the
value of being unemployed forever (which is ﬁnite) and
P1
t=0 ¯tE[wt],
the sum of the expected present values of accepting an oﬀer at date




























if and only if (2.2) holds. Hence if (2.2) is satisﬁed, the value function
(2.1) is ﬁnite. It can be shown that if (2.2) fails, then the value function
is inﬁnite.
If the wage oﬀer is suﬃciently low, then it is advantageous to remain
unemployed. Deﬁne w¤ to be the smallest wage oﬀer such that the
unemployed worker is better oﬀ accepting than rejecting the oﬀer; w¤
is known as the reservation wage. That is, the worker accepts the
oﬀer w if and only if w ¸ w¤. Let w be the current wage oﬀer, and
V (w; ˆ w) be the value of the oﬀer when ˆ w is chosen as a candidate for
the reservation wage. If the oﬀer is accepted, the worker gets w from
now on, therefore
V (w; ˆ w) =
w
1 ¡ ¯
; if w ¸ ˆ w; (2.3)
otherwise, the worker gets b this period and a new oﬀer next period,
hence
V (w; ˆ w) = b + ¯E[V (w1; ˆ w) j w0 = w]; if w < ˆ w: (2.4)
Notice that in the traditional labor search model, the continuation
payoﬀ in (2.4) is E[V (w; ˆ w)]. This implies that current prices/wages
do not convey any information about expected future payoﬀs, which is6 S. BOYARCHENKO
unrealistic. In that model, the value of rejecting an oﬀer is indepen-
dent of w, and the value of accepting is increasing in w, therefore the
reservation wage is the one that equates these two values.
2.2. Reservation wage and value of an oﬀer. We want to ﬁnd the
reservation wage, w¤, that maximizes the value function:
V (w;w
¤) ¸ V (w; ˆ w); 8 w and ˆ w: (2.5)
To this end, we ﬁx an arbitrary ˆ w and solve equations (2.3) and (2.4) for
V . By comparing solutions for various ˆ w, we ﬁnd a unique w¤ satisfying
(2.5). In this subsection, we present and discuss the formulas for w¤





ws and ¯ wt = max
0·s·t
ws;
the processes w = fwtg and ¯ w = f ¯ wtg will be called the inﬁmum and
supremum wage processes respectively. Let T be an exponentially dis-
tributed random variable, independent of fYtg, with the mean ¯=(1¡¯)
(in other words, T takes values t = 0;1;::: with probability (1¡¯)¯t).
The reservation wage is given by
w¤
b








tE[ ¯ wtj w0 = 1] =
P1




If there is no uncertainty, then trivially, w¤ = b. If wages follow
a stochastic process, then there is a risk: if the worker accepts the
oﬀer b · w, she misses the opportunity of receiving higher oﬀers in
the future. Hence there is the hurdle w¤=b the wage oﬀer must clear
in order to be accepted. By (2.6), the hurdle equals the ratio of the
expected wage accepted at random time T, given the wages follow
the supremum process, and the current wage w. According to (2.7),
the hurdle is the ratio of two expected present values of wage income
streams: the one in the numerator is for supremum wages while the
value in the denominator is calculated for the constant stream wt = w.
If the probability of negative jumps in wages increases, E[ ¯ wt] decreases,
hence the hurdle decreases as well. This agrees with the fact that
people are willing to take lower paid jobs when they expect wages
to drop. Similarly, if the probability of positive jumps increases, the
hurdle increases as well, hence increasing upward uncertainty in wagesSEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 7
may cause reduction in the supply of labor. Recall that in the standard
job search model (see, e.g., Sargent (1987)),
w









This is a non-linear equation which does not admit a closed form solu-
tion except for special cases. Our approach provides an explicit formula
for the reservation wage together with the natural interpretation of the
formula.
Our next result is the formula for the value function in the region






¤); w < w
¤; (2.8)
where the ﬁrst term is the value of accepting the current oﬀer, and
Vs(w;w¤) is the option value of searching. The option value Vs(w;w¤)




E[ ¯ wTj w0 = w]
¢
E[(w¤ ¡ ¯ wT)+j w0 = w]
1 ¡ ¯
; (2.9)
where (w¤ ¡ ¯ wT)+ ´ maxfw¤ ¡ ¯ wT;0g. We see that the ﬁrst factor
in (2.9) is the reciprocal of the hurdle introduced by (2.6), and the
second factor is proportional to the expected value of the European
put option on the supremum of wage with the strike price w¤ and the









¤ ¡ ¯ wt)+j w0 = w]: (2.10)
The last equation makes it clear that the option value of searching is
positive as long as the supremum of wage is below the reservation wage,
and at the reservation wage, the option value of searching vanishes.






¤); w < w
¤; (2.11)
here the ﬁrst summand is the value of staying unemployed forever, and





E[ ¯ wTj w0 = w]
¢
E[(¯ wT ¡ w¤)+j w0 = w]
1 ¡ ¯
: (2.12)
The second factor in (2.12) is determined by the expected value of the
European call option on the supremum of wage with the strike price
w¤ and the random date of expiry T.8 S. BOYARCHENKO







The last equation says that the diﬀerence between the option value
of future employment opportunities and the option value of searching
equals the present value of the gain of accepting the current oﬀer.
3. Benchmark model: proofs
3.1. Reduction to the Wiener-Hopf equation. Here we present
the rigorous derivation of the results described in Section 2; the most
technical parts of the proof are delegated to the Appendix. In Section
2, we used the current wage as the state variable, which is non-negative,
therefore the state space there is R+. In order to prove the results, we
use the state space for log-wages, which is R, because the choice of the
half-line as the state space requires much more diﬃcult technique. So,
instead of characterizing the state by w, we use x = lnw as a generic
state variable; and w(x) = ex is the current wage oﬀer. Fix a candidate
for the log-reservation wage, h 2 R, and set W(x;h) = V (w(x);w(h)),
We(x;h) = Ve(w(x);w(h)), Ws(x;h) = Vs(w(x);w(h)).
In order to ﬁnd the value function W(¢;h), we want to reduce the
original optimization problem to the Wiener-Hopf equation and solve
the latter by the Wiener-Hopf factorization method. This method
can be applied and explained in the easiest way when one deals with
bounded functions. However in our model, the value function is un-
bounded because with the optimal choice of the reservation wage,
the value function grows in the same way as the wage, that is ex-
ponentially. To deal with the problem, we introduce the wage ceiling
wn(x) ´ minfw(x);w(n)g, where n > lnb. Let W n be the value func-
tion deﬁned by (2.1) for the case when the worker faces the wage oﬀer
wn, and w(h) is chosen as a candidate for the reservation wage. Since
the instantaneous utility of the worker cannot be greater than w(n),
function W n is bounded by w(n)=(1¡¯). Clearly, for each x, W n(x;h)





After the analytic expression for W n(x;h) is obtained, we will pass to
the limit and ﬁnd W(x;h).
For a Markov process X, denote a family of operators, fPtg, acting
in L1(R) as follows:
Ptf(x) = E[f(Xt) j X0 = x]:SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 9
Set P ´ P1. Clearly, kPtk = 1, 8 t, and by the law of iterated ex-
pectations, Pt = P t. Following the same reasoning as in Section 2, we





; if x ¸ h; (3.1)
W
n(x;h) = b + ¯PW
n(x;h); if x < h: (3.2)
As before, deﬁne the option value of searching by
W
n





Notice that W n









Equations (3.1)–(3.3) imply that
(I ¡ ¯P)W
n
s (x;h) = ¡(I ¡ ¯P)g
n
0(x); x < h; (3.4)
W
n
s (x;h) = 0; x ¸ h; (3.5)
where gn








s (x + h;h); (3.7)
and rewrite the problem (3.4)–(3.5) as
(I ¡ ¯P) ˜ W
n(x) = ¡(I ¡ ¯P)g
n(x); x < 0; (3.8)
˜ W
n(x) = 0; x ¸ 0: (3.9)
Equation (3.8) subject to (3.9) is called the Wiener-Hopf equation; it
can be solved by the Wiener-Hopf factorization method. The method
can be applied in diﬀerent (essentially equivalent) analytical and sto-
chastic forms - see the discussion in Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i
(2002). Unlike in the above monograph, here we use the stochastic
form till the end when it is necessary to obtain explicit formulas and
the analytical tools become indispensable. We believe that this form
is more suitable for applications in Economics.
We know that ˜ W n and gn are bounded, therefore we may look for
a solution to the system (3.8)–(3.9) in L1(R). For ˜ W n, a solution to
(3.8)–(3.9), deﬁne function g1 by
(I ¡ ¯P) ˜ W
n = ¡(I ¡ ¯P)g
n + g1: (3.10)10 S. BOYARCHENKO
By construction, g1 2 L1(R) and vanishes on R¡; hence g1 2 L1(R+).
3 It is obvious that the problem (3.8)–(3.9) is equivalent to the following
problem: ﬁnd W 2 L1(R¡) and g1 2 L1(R+) which satisfy (3.10).
3.2. Expected present value and resolvent. If g1 in (3.10) had
been known, ˜ W n could have been found easily by using the inverse to
I ¡ ¯P:
(I ¡ ¯P)
¡1 = I + ¯P + ¯
2P






The series converges because k¯Pk = ¯kPk = ¯ 2 (0;1). By applying
(3.11) to (3.10) we would have obtained
˜ W
n = ¡g































tE[f(Xt)j X0 = x]:
In other words, the resolvent operator applied to a function f gives the
expected present value of the stochastic stream f(Xt). The argument
above shows that for the random walk X,
U
¯
X(I ¡ ¯P) = (I ¡ ¯P)U
¯
X = I or
U
¯




¡1 = I ¡ ¯P: (3.13)
3.3. Inﬁmum and supremum processes and Wiener-Hopf fac-
torization. If g1 had been known, to ﬁnd ˜ W n, it would have suﬃced
to compute the expected present value of the stream g1(Xt). Unfor-
tunately, g1 is unknown, so (3.12) does not help. Nevertheless, ˜ W n
can be written in terms of resolvents (expected present values) not
of the random walk X, but of the processes Nt = min0·s·t Xs and
Mt = max0·s·t Xs which are called the inﬁmum and supremum pro-
cesses respectively, as their analogs in continuous time. The Wiener-
Hopf factorization theorem (see the Appendix) allows one to factorize
3Recall that one writes f 2 L1(R¨), if f 2 L1(R) vanishes on R§. Clearly,
L1(R¨) ½ L1(R) is a subspace.SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 11
U
¯





























n + (1 ¡ ¯)g1: (3.15)















bounded (it suﬃces to notice that jE[f(x + Mt)]j · jjfjj, hence the
norm of U
¯
M is bounded by 1+¯ +¯2 +¢¢¢ = (1¡¯)¡1, and the same












¡1 = (1 ¡ ¯)(I ¡ ¯P)U
¯
M
are bounded as well.
For the next step, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let z 2 (0;1). Then
a) For any f 2 L1(R¡), we have Uz
Mf 2 L1(R¡), and moreover,
Uz
M : L1(R¡) ! L1(R¡) is invertible;
b) For any f 2 L1(R+), we have Uz
Nf 2 L1(R+), and moreover,
Uz
N : L1(R+) ! L1(R+) is invertible.
Proof. a) Let x > 0. Then for each t, and each realization Mt(!),
! 2 Ω, of Mt, we have f(x+Mt(!)) = 0, and hence E[f(x+Mt)] = 0.
Thus, Uz
Mf(x) = 0. To prove that (Uz
M)¡1f(x) = 0 as well, a more
detailed study of the structure of Uz
M is needed (see the Appendix).
b) is proved similarly. ¤
Now we can explicitly solve (3.15). We have g1 2 L1(R+), hence by
applying U
¯









n + g2; (3.17)
where g2 2 L1(R+). By construction, ˜ W n 2 L1(R¡), and on the
strength of Lemma 1, the LHS in (3.17) belongs to L1(R¡). Hence,






















and using (3.6) and (3.7), we obtain
W
n












We have found a unique bounded solution to the Wiener-Hopf equation;
hence, it is the option value of searching W n



































i»MTj X0 = 0
¤







































and one easily derives that ((1¡¯)U
¯
M)¡1e°x = Á+(¯;¡i°)¡1e°x. Now















h ¡ b = 0: (3.24)
Then w¤ = eh¤ is the reservation wage.
Proof. First notice that the optimality condition (2.5) can be written
in terms of log-wages and the option value of searching as
W(x;h








+ Ws(x;h) 8 x and h:SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 13
Therefore to prove the optimality of the choice of h = h¤, we need
to check condition (3.25). If in addition, we show that (3.25) holds
as a strict inequality for some x and h 6= h¤, then the choice of the
reservation wage is unique. Let y(x) = b ¡ Á+(¯;¡i)¡1ex. Consider
the diﬀerence
W(x;h














(x) is non-negative and positive on
(h;h¤) if h < h¤ (or on (h¤;h) if h > h¤)). Since the resolvent operator
maps non-trivial non-negative functions into non-trivial non-negative
ones, we conclude that h¤ satisﬁes the optimality condition (3.25) which
holds as a strict inequality for some x and h 6= h¤.
¤
It remains to substitute
Á
+(¯;¡i) = E[e
MTj X0 = 0] = E[ ¯ wTj w0 = 1]
into (3.24) to get (2.6). Thus the ﬁrst main result obtains.
To derive the formula for the option value of searching, we use (3.24)








































+ j X0 = x
i
1 ¡ ¯
Substituting wages for the log-wages in the last equation, one gets (2.9).
Finally, recall that














































Thus, the formulas for the option value of searching and option value
of the future employment opportunities obtain.
4. Model with layoffs
Suppose that each period after the ﬁrst period on the job, the worker
faces a probability 0 < ¸ < 1 of being laid oﬀ. The probability ¸ of
being laid oﬀ next period is assumed to be independent of tenure. If
the worker is laid oﬀ, she gets the unemployment income b immediately
and sits out a period before a new oﬀer may arrive. As in Section 2,
we look for the reservation wage w¤. Fix an arbitrary ˆ w, a candidate
for the reservation wage. Let A(w; ˆ w) be the value of accepting the
current oﬀer w and U(w; ˆ w) be the value of rejecting the oﬀer. Then
the value function of the worker is given by
V (w; ˆ w) = maxfA(w; ˆ w);U(w; ˆ w)g:
Now we specify U(w; ˆ w) and A(w; ˆ w). if the worker rejects the oﬀer,
she receives b this period and a new oﬀer next period, therefore the
value of rejecting the oﬀer is
U(w; ˆ w) = b + ¯E[V (w1; ˆ w)j w0 = w]: (4.1)
If the worker accepts the oﬀer, she receives w immediately; with prob-
ability ¸ she is laid oﬀ the next period and becomes unemployed, and
with probability 1 ¡ ¸ she remains on the job. Therefore the value of
accepting is
A(w; ˆ w) = w + ¸¯E[U(w1; ˆ w)j w0 = w] + (1 ¡ ¸)¯A(w; ˆ w):
Substituting (4.1) for U, we can solve the last equation for A(w; ˆ w):
A(w; ˆ w) =
w + ¸¯b
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
+
¸¯2
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
E[V (w2; ˆ w)j w0 = w]: (4.2)
Here we used the law of iterated expectations:
E [E[V (w2; ˆ w)j w1]j w0 = w] = E[V (w2; ˆ w)j w0 = w]:
Write (4.1) and (4.2) as
V (w; ˆ w) = b + ¯E[V (w1; ˆ w)j w0 = w]; if w < ˆ w;
V (w; ˆ w) =
w + ¸¯b
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
+ ˜ ¯E[V (w2; ˆ w)j w0 = w]; if w ¸ ˆ w;SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 15
where ˜ ¯ ´
¸¯2
1¡¯(1¡¸). Introduce, as before, the option value of searching
Vs(w; ˆ w) = V (w; ˆ w) ¡ A(w; ˆ w).
Further we proceed as in Section 3. We change the state space from
R+ to R, the state space of log-wages, and keep the notation for the
value functions as in Section 3. Next, we consider the value function
W n(x;h) for the optimization problem with the wage ceiling wn(x) (see
Section 3). This value function satisﬁes the following equations:
W
n(x;h) = b + ¯PW




1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
+ ˜ ¯E[W
n(x + Y1 + Y2;h)]; if x ¸ h: (4.4)
On the RHS of (4.4), we see the sum of two copies of i.i.d. Yj; hence
it is natural to consider not only the process X = fXtgt¸0, but the
process ˜ X ´ fX2tgt¸0 as well. Let f ˜ Ptg be the corresponding family of
operators: ˜ Ptf(x) = E[f( ˜ Xt)j X0 = x]. Set ˜ P = ˜ P1 and notice that by
the law of iterated expectations, ˜ P = P 2.




s (x;h) = W
n(x;h) ¡ A
n(x;h);
which (on the strength of (4.4)) is equivalent to
W
n





1(x) = (wn(x) ¡ b)=(1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)). As in Section 3, we will
solve the problem (4.3)–(4.4) for the option value of searching. First,
by (4.5),
W
n(x;h) = (I ¡ ˜ ¯ ˜ P)
¡1W
n




next, by substituting (4.6) into (4.3)–(4.4) we arrive at the system
(I ¡ ¯P)(I ¡ ˜ ¯ ˜ P)
¡1W
n
s (x;h) = ¡(I ¡ ¯P)(I ¡ ˜ ¯ ˜ P)
¡1g
n
1(x); x < h;
W
n









s (x + h;h); (4.8)
then ˜ W n
s (x) is a solution to
(I¡¯P)(I¡ ˜ ¯ ˜ P)
¡1 ˜ W
n(x) = ¡(I¡¯P)(I¡ ˜ ¯ ˜ P)
¡1g
n(x); x < 0; (4.9)
˜ W
n(x) = 0; x ¸ 0: (4.10)16 S. BOYARCHENKO
Problem (4.9)–(4.10) is equivalent to; ﬁnd ˜ W n 2 L1(R¡) and g2 2
L1(R+) satisfying
(I¡¯P)(I¡˜ ¯ ˜ P)
¡1 ˜ W





˜ X be the resolvent and ˜ M, ˜ N be the supremum and inﬁmum
processes for ˜ X. Then




and by the Wiener-Hopf factorization,
(1 ¡ ˜ ¯)
¡1U
˜ ¯













¡1 = (1 ¡ ˜ ¯)(I ¡ ˜ ¯ ˜ P)U
˜ ¯
˜ N: (4.13)

























+ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ˜ ¯)
¡1g2(x): (4.14)
Using Lemma 1, we can explicitly solve (4.14). First, notice that the
resolvents of the supremum and inﬁmum processes of X and ˜ X com-
mute (see the Appendix), hence the factors in (4.14) do. Second, recall



















n(x) + G2(x); (4.15)
where G2 2 L1(R+). By construction, ˜ W n 2 L1(R¡), and therefore
by Lemma 1, the LHS in (4.15) belongs to L1(R¡). Hence, multiplying





























Finally, we return to the original variables and on the strength of (4.7)
and (4.8) obtain from (4.16)
W
n













Thus, we have got a unique bounded solution to the Wiener-Hopf equa-
tion (4.9)–(4.10), therefore W n
s is the option value of searching in the
problem with the wage ceiling. Similarly as it was done in Section 3,SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 17
it is possible to show that one can use (3.16), (4.13), and the mono-
tone convergence theorem and pass to the limit in (4.17) as n ! 1 to


























1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
¶
(x):
Notice that (1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸))¡1 = (1 ¡ ˜ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯)¡1(1 + ¸¯)¡1, hence we
can rewrite the last equation as


































By (4.13), the last formula is equivalent to
Ws(x;h) = (1 + ¸¯)









Also, we may pass to the limit as n ! 1 in (4.6) and using (4.12),
derive








1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
¶¶
(x); (4.19)









1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
+
1 ¡ ¯













h ¡ b = 0: (4.21)
Then w¤ = eh¤ is the reservation wage.
Proof. Is similar to the proof of Theorem 2, and the same uniqueness
(of the reservation wage) result obtains. ¤18 S. BOYARCHENKO









eMtj X0 = 0
¤





˜ Mtj X0 = 0
¤: (4.22)
Let $t = e
˜ Mt be the supremum of the wage process with two time units






t=0 ¯tE [ ¯ wtj w0 = 1]
(1 ¡ ˜ ¯)
P1
t=0 ˜ ¯tE [$tj w0 = 1]
: (4.23)
The last equation says that in the model with layoﬀs, the hurdle is
proportional to the ratio of two expected present values: the one in the
numerator is computed for the stream of payoﬀs of the supremum of
wages, and the value in the denominator is calculated for the stream
of payoﬀs of the supremum of wages oﬀered every other period and
discounted by ˜ ¯.













t=0 ˜ ¯tE [$tj w0 = w]
:
Hence the hurdle can be written as a product of two factors: the ﬁrst
one accounts for the risk of future positive jumps in wage oﬀers (it is the
hurdle in the benchmark model). The second factor is the reciprocal
of the hurdle in the benchmark model with the discount factor ˜ ¯ and
wage oﬀers arriving every other period. This factor compensates the
risk of future positive jumps in wages because the worker can be laid
oﬀ with positive probability, and if this happens, the worker gets a new
oﬀer in a period from the moment of layoﬀ.






¤ ¡ ¯ wt)+j w0 = w];
which is one of the factors in the option value of searching in the bench-
mark model (see (2.10)). Let f ˜ wtg = fw2tg and !t = e
˜ Nt be respec-






tE[V(!t)j w0 = w]:SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 19




(1 ¡ ¯)(1 + ¸¯)
+
P1
t=0 ˜ ¯tE[ ˜ wtj w0 = w]
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸)
+
b(1 ¡ ¯)
w¤(1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¸))
Υ(w): (4.24)
If ¸ = 0, then (4.22) and (4.24) reduce to (2.7) and (2.8) and (2.10) for
the reservation wage and value function in the benchmark model.
5. Numerical example





and ¸¡ < ¡1 < 0 < ¸+, c§ > 0, c++c¡ = 1. Here c+ and c¡ character-
ize the intensity of negative and positive jumps in wages respectively,





+ ). Denote by ˆ p the Fourier trans-






















¡¸¡¸+ ¡ i»(c¡¸¡ + c+¸+)
(¡¸¡ ¡ i»)(¸+ + i»)
:
Let z 2 (0;1). To calculate Á+(z;¡i), which enters the reservation
wage equation (3.24) for z = ¯ in the benchmark model, we need to
factorize
1 ¡ zˆ p(¡») =
(1 ¡ z)(¡¸¡¸+) ¡ i»(¸+ + ¸¡ ¡ z(c¡¸¡ + c+¸+)) + »2
(¡¸¡ ¡ i»)(¸+ + i»)
Set » = ¡i®, then the equation
1 ¡ zˆ p(¡») = 0 (5.2)
turns into
®
2 + ®(¸+ + ¸¡ ¡ z(c¡¸¡ + c+¸+)) ¡ (¡¸¡¸+)(1 ¡ z) = 0: (5.3)20 S. BOYARCHENKO








D = [(¸¡ + ¸+) ¡ z(c¡¸¡ + c+¸+)]
2 + 4(1 ¡ z)(¡¸¡¸+):
Since z < 1 and ¡¸¡¸+ > 0, we conclude that ®+(z) > 0 and ®¡(z) <
0, hence (5.2) has one root ¡i®+(z) in the lower half-plane, and one root
¡i®¡(z) in the upper half-plane. Recall the Wiener-Hopf factorization
formula (A.7)
1 ¡ z




Since the LHS in the last formula is a rational function, it is possible to
show that Á+(z;») (respectively, Á¡(z;»)) is a rational function which
has neither zeros nor poles in the half-plane =» > 0 (respectively,
=» < 0), and Á§(z;0) = 1 (see, e.g., Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i




















Recall, that in the model with layoﬀs ˜ P = P 2, therefore in this
model, we have to factorize
1 ¡ ˜ ¯
1 ¡ ˜ ¯ˆ p(¡»)2 =
³
1 ¡ ˜ ¯1=2
´³
1 + ˜ ¯1=2
´
³
1 ¡ ˜ ¯1=2ˆ p(¡»)
´³





By the same reasoning as above, we conclude that
˜ Á



























: (5.9)SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 21

















(¡¸¡ ¡ 1)®+(¯)(®+(˜ ¯1=2) ¡ 1)(®+(¡˜ ¯1=2) ¡ 1)
¡¸¡®+(˜ ¯1=2)®+(¡˜ ¯1=2)(®+(¯) ¡ 1)
: (5.10)
Notice that (5.1) can be viewed as the simplest way of approximation of
the empirical probability density of log-wages by exponential polynomi-
als. More sophisticated approximations with exponential polynomials
can be used as well which still keep the model analytically tractable.
Even the simple four parameter family of processes considered here
contains jumps in both directions and allows to control sizes of large
and small jumps. At the same time, the factors in the Wiener-Hopf
factorization formula can be calculated explicitly in terms of roots of
a quadratic equation. The analytical formulas (5.7) and (5.10) for the
reservation wages in the benchmark model and the model with layoﬀs
can be used for comparative statics analysis. By the latter, one can
infer how unemployed workers respond to the changes in parameters
of the underlying stochastic process. Moreover, in the next section, for
the same PDF, we derive an explicit formula for the expected waiting
time till a job oﬀer is accepted, which also depends on the parameters
of the process for log-wages.
6. Expected waiting time
Assume that the current wage oﬀer w is less than w¤, set y = lnw¤¡
lnw = h¤ ¡ x, and consider the waiting time Ry till the job oﬀer is
accepted. This is the random variable deﬁned by
Ry = minft > 0 j Xt ¸ h
¤g:22 S. BOYARCHENKO




































An analytical form for the last expression can be derived for wide classes
of random walks, but in general, the resulting formula is rather cumber-
some, and uses the explicit formulas for the factors in the Wiener-Hopf
factorization formulas. Here we restrict ourselves to a special case when
the probability density is given by (5.1).
Theorem 4. a) The expected waiting time till a job oﬀer is accepted
is ﬁnite if and only if
C0 ´ ¸+(1 ¡ c+) + ¸¡(1 ¡ c¡) > 0: (6.2)




(y ¡ 1=¸¡): (6.3)
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
In the case of a continuous probability density, when the tails of
probability density p match at the origin, we have c+ = c¡ = 1=2, and
(6.2) and (6.3) become simpler:
¸+ + ¸¡ > 0;
equivalently,





(y ¡ 1=¸¡): (6.5)
Condition (6.4) has a simple interpretation: the expected waiting time
is ﬁnite if and only if the drift of the log-wage, m, is positive, and ifSEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 23
it is positive, then (6.5) says that the expected waiting time is inverse
proportional to the drift, as in the deterministic continuous time model.
Notice however that neither the term ¡1=¸¡ nor the answer in the
generic case c+ 6= c¡ admit such simple interpretations.
7. Conclusion
The paper is the ﬁrst attempt to model wage oﬀers evolving as a geo-
metric random walk as opposed to random draws from independent dis-
tribution in the conventional job-search models. Such non-stationarity
may be due to business cycle eﬀects or idiosyncratic eﬀects (if a worker
remains unemployed for suﬃciently long time, the job market may start
viewing her as a loser, which may result in lower wages) or both. From
our point of view, the suggested modeling is more realistic, because the
state of the model today aﬀects its state tomorrow. Hence the agents
when deciding whether to work or not have to take into consideration,
what wages they may be oﬀered tomorrow, given the oﬀers they are
facing today. For the job-search models with and without layoﬀs, we
obtained closed form solutions for reservation wages, value functions
and the expected waiting time before a job oﬀer is accepted. The re-
sults admit meaningful economic interpretation in terms of expected
present values of relevant payoﬀ streams. The results are mainly driven
by the supremum process for wages, which indicates that for a worker’s
decision whether to accept an oﬀer or not, record setting wages rather
than all wage movements matter.
For a special case of the PDF given by an exponential polynomial,
simple analytical formulas for reservation wages and the expected wait-
ing time are derived, which are suitable for comparative statics analysis.
Nobody would argue that it is crucial to study how labor force partici-
pants respond to variations in exogenous factors. The determination of
the factors aﬀecting the length of time spent out of work by unemployed
individuals is an important matter with signiﬁcant applications for the
design and impact of policies such as unemployment compensation, for
instance.
We restricted the analysis for the case of linear utility function for
expositional simplicity. The model can be easily generalized for the
case of Cobb-Douglas utility, which is one of the ways to depart from
a representative agent. By varying parameters of the utility function,
one can introduce heterogeneous workers in the job-search models and
consider aggregate labor force ﬂuctuations, which is a prerequisite for
understanding how ﬂuctuations in the nation’s output of goods and
services propagate over time.24 S. BOYARCHENKO
To be more consistent with Macro Economic Theory, it would be
necessary to model log-wages not as a random walk, but as an AR(1)
process. Such extension of our model is also feasible; the solution
is accessible only by quantitative methods, including the ﬁnite time
horizon case.
Appendix A
A.1. The Wiener-Hopf factorization. Let z 2 (0;1), let Y1;Y2;¢¢¢
be i.i.d. random variables with the probability distribution ¹(dx). Let
Xt = X0 + Y1 + ¢¢¢ + Yt be the random walk started at 0: X0 = 0,
and denote by ¹t(dx) the probability distribution of Xt. Let T be a
random variable independent of X and taking values in f0;1;:::g, with
P(T = t) = (1 ¡ z)zt. Consider the random variable XT.




































































































= (1 ¡ z)=[1 ¡ zˆ ¹(¡»)]:
By using (A.6), (A.4) and (A.5), we can rewrite (A.1) as
(1 ¡ z)=[1 ¡ zˆ ¹(¡»)] = Á
+(z;»)Á
¡(z;»): (A.7)
The factors Á§ enjoy the following important property.
Lemma 6. For any z 2 (0;1), Á§(z;») and 1=Á§(z;») are holomor-
phic and bounded in the half-plane §=» > 0 and continuous up to the
boundary of the half-plane.
Proof. It suﬃces to notice that the expression under the exponent sign
in (A.2) (resp., (A.3)) is holomorphic in the half-plane =» > 0 (resp.,
=» < 0) and bounded up to the boundary of the half-plane. ¤
A.2. Resolvents as PDO. Let u be a suﬃciently regular function,
say, u 2 S(R) (that is, u(x) and each of its derivatives decay at inﬁnity
























































ix»(1 ¡ zˆ p(¡»))
¡1ˆ u(»)d»:26 S. BOYARCHENKO







Then one says that A is a pseudo-diﬀerential operator (PDO) with the
symbol a and writes A = a(D) (in some cases, the integration along
a diﬀerent line =» = ¾ in the complex plane must be used - see e.g.
Boyarchenko and Levendorskiˇ i (2002)). Thus, the resolvent Uz
X is a
PDO with the symbol (1 ¡ zˆ p(¡»))¡1:
U
z
X = (1 ¡ zˆ p(¡D))
¡1:








A.3. Proof of (3.14). Now we can rewrite (A.7) as













A.4. Proof of Lemma 1. To ﬁnish the proof for Uz
M, we have to show






























¡1g)(x) ´ (˜ Á
¡(z;D)
¡1g)(x) = 0;
where ˜ Á¡ is the minus-factor in the Wiener-Hopf factorization formula
for the resolvent of the process ¡X (the reader should not confuse the
notation ˜ Á¡ here with the same notation introduced for the process ˜ X










¡(z;»)ˆ g(»)d»; (A.10)SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 27
where ¾ = 0. Since g 2 C1
0 ((0;+1)), its Fourier transform admits
the analytic continuation into the half-space =» < 0, and in the closed
half-plane, it satisﬁes an estimate
jˆ g(»)j · CN(1 + j»j)
¡N; (A.11)
for any N, where CN depends on N but not on ». By Lemma 6,
˜ Á¡(z;»)¡1 is bounded in the same closed half-plane, therefore the inte-
grand in (A.10) admits the estimate (A.11). By the Cauchy theorem,
we may push the line of integration in (A.10) down: ¾ ! ¡1; in the
limit, the integral (A.10) vanishes, and we are done.
A.5. Proof of (3.20). First, we use (3.16) to rewrite (3.19) as
W
n































Notice that Á¡(¯;¡i) < 1 by Lemma 6, and using (A.2) and (A.4),





N are operators with non-negative kernels, and (A.12)





























A.6. Commutativity of resolvents of supremum and inﬁmum
processes of M, N, ˜ M and ˜ N. Each of these resolvents is a PDO
on R with the symbol independent of the state variable. By applying
the Fourier transform, we see that the product of such two PDO’s is a
PDO whose symbol is the product of the symbols. Hence, these PDO’s
commute.28 S. BOYARCHENKO
A.7. Proof of Theorem 4. Fix y > 0, and deﬁne the function u(z) =
1(¡1;y)(z). Let ˆ u(») be the Fourier transform of u. It is deﬁned in the







where ¾ > 0 is arbitrary. By applying U
¯
M to (A.13), and using the
formula U
¯











Then use the explicit formula (5.5) for the factor Á+(¯;») and substi-



















We can push the line of integration down. It crosses two poles of the
integrand at » = 0 and » = ¡i®+(¯), and by using the residue theorem,




















By integrating by part in the last integral, we obtain an absolutely



















Hence, the integral in (A.15) vanishes in the limit ¾1 ! ¡1, and we
conclude that the last term in (A.15) is zero.
If C0 < 0, then from (5.4), we conclude that ®+(¯) > 0 remains
bounded away from 0 as ¯ ! 1 ¡ 0: ®+(¯) ¸ d, where d > 0 is





= +1:SEARCH, LAYOFFS AND RESERVATION WAGES 29
If C0 = 0, then from (5.4), ®+(¯) » d
p



































» (y + 1=(¡¸¡))
®+(¯)
1 ¡ ¯




Theorem 4 has been proved.
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